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Abstract
This paper proposes and illustrates the use of a new approach to benefit transfer for the
non-market valuation of environmental resources.  It treats transfer as an identification
problem that requires assessing whether available benefit estimates permit the parameters of a
preference function to be identified.  The transfer method proposed uses these identifying
restrictions to calibrate preference parameters and bases the benefit estimates on that
preference function.  The approach is illustrated using travel cost, hedonic and contingent
valuation estimates, as well as combinations of estimates.  It has three potential advantages
over conventional practice:  (1) it allows multiple, potentially overlapping estimates of the
benefits of an improvement in environmental quality to be combined consistently; (2) it
assures the transferred estimates of the benefits attributed to a proposed change can never
exceed income; and (3) it provides a set of additional "outputs" that offer plausibility checks
of the benefit transfers.
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BENEFIT TRANSFER AS PREFERENCE CALIBRATION
V. Kerry Smith, George Van Houtven,
and Subhrendu Pattanayak*
I.   INTRODUCTION
Most uses of applied welfare analysis for environmental resources, whether benefit-cost
calculations or natural resource damage assessments, rely on adaptations of existing benefit
estimates rather than new research for their evaluation of policies or injuries affecting these
resources.  Almost ten years ago, David Brookshire [1992] organized a set of papers in Water
Resources Research to focus attention on the practice of benefits transfer.  Since then, there has
been growing interest in research on the potential for improvement in these techniques, but
little methodological progress.  The best overall summary of what has been learned about these
methods over the past decade is reflected in a common conclusion reached by three recent and
independent evaluations--conventional benefit transfers are very unreliable!1  The procedures
used in these adaptations of existing research generally seek to measure the benefits from a
quantity or a quality increase.  However the framework used in most cases arises from an
approximation introduced for measuring the consumer surplus associated with price changes.
To our knowledge, there has not been an attempt to develop an alternative method.
This paper proposes a new approach to benefit transfer and illustrates how it would work
using three empirical examples.  Rather than computing a unit value or constructing a statistical
function describing how unit values change with the economic or demographic variables
associated with the samples used for existing benefit studies, the same existing research can
calibrate a specific preference function.  The required benefit measures can then be computed
from that function.  This strategy has three advantages over conventional methods: (1) it allows
multiple, potentially overlapping estimates of the benefits of an improvement in environmental
quality to be combined consistently; (2) it assures the transferred estimates of the benefits
attributed to a proposed change can never exceed income; and (3) it provides a set of additional
"outputs" that offer plausibility checks of the benefit transfers.
After describing the steps that usually comprise a conventional benefit transfer and
their relationship to Hicks-Harberger approximations for consumer surplus in Section II, we
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outline our preference calibration approach using three examples in Section III.  This section
closes by discussing some potential shortcomings with our proposal and suggesting how it
could be used to modify meta analyses of benefit studies.  The last section provides some
policy context for our proposal and argues that applied benefit analyses for large scale policy
changes, based on some type of transfer, must be restricted to assure consistency with the
economic properties of a willingness to pay function if the results are to be taken seriously.
II.   BACKGROUND
Benefit transfer is the practice of adapting available estimates of the economic value
for a change in environmental quality (or quantity) to evaluate a proposed, policy induced,
change in the same or a "similar" resource.  In these situations, the analyst is typically taking
the results from one or more existing studies (defined in terms of their time frame, the
location, the environmental resource, or quality change, and the affected population), and
transferring them to a different context that is relevant for a policy being evaluated.  The new
policy context can require changes in both the features of the resource and the characteristics
of the people who care about it.
Most benefit transfer methods utilize either the benefit value or the benefit function
approaches.  In the case of a benefit value approach, a single point estimate (usually a mean
willingness to pay, WTP, estimate) or value range is typically used to summarize the results
of one or more studies that have been developed for another purpose.  For example, an
average consumer surplus per fishing trip might be taken from a recreational travel cost study
or a mean (marginal) WTP estimate for a unit change in lake water quality might be inferred
from a hedonic property value study.  These values are then used to evaluate the benefits from
proposed policies that change water quality at different locations.  In these applications, the
transfers are intended to assess the economic value of fishing trips or changes in lake quality
in new areas.  In the case of a benefit function transfer, a model has been estimated to
describe how benefit measures (from one or more existing studies) change with the
characteristics of the study population or the resource being evaluated.2  With this second
approach, the entire equation (function) is transferred to the policy context and the benefit
estimate is then "tailored" to conform as closely as possible to meet the new population's
characteristics as well as to reflect the affected resource's features.  For example, a travel cost
demand model from one site might be used with the income, average travel costs, and quality
conditions for a policy site to estimate the consumer surplus under different conditions.
                                               
2 These benefit functions usually come from one of two sources.  The first is from contingent valuation (CV)
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Benefit transfers usually proceed in four steps:
1. Translate the policy change into one or more quantity changes for the uses linked to
an environmental resource that are permitted because of the policy change for the
typical user.3
2. Estimate the number of typical users before and after the policy change.
3. Transfer a per "unit" consumer surplus measure, with the unit measure comparable
to the index used in step (1).
4. Combine estimates in steps (1) through (3) for each year considered in the analysis
and compute the discounted aggregate benefit measures.4
When the process is described in this way it resembles the methods used to approximate
willingness to pay measures for price changes.  Equation (1) translates the steps to a simple
relationship describing the typical benefit transfer.






P ￿ - ￿
D
=   (1)
where
CSP  =  estimate of consumer surplus for policy being evaluated.
di  = the amount of use permitted by policy change (i = 1) and in absence of the
policy change (i = 0) by a typical user (e.g. visits per year).
Ni  =  the number of people engaged in the use with policy change (i = 1) and
without (i = 0)
CST  = consumer surplus gain (for a representative individual) measured in other
literature for a change (or set of changes) judged to be comparable to how
policy affects d
DdT  = change presented in existing literature for the measurement of CST
The distinction between the use of benefit value or benefit function arises from what is
substituted in equation (1) for (CST/DdT).  This approach focuses the analysis at the individual
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measures--see Bockstael and McConnell [1993] and more recently Ebert [1998] for further discussion.
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level and will be influenced by the characterization of "d."  In the recreation context, the
measure for d is usually a trip or day.  However, in the health context it could be an episode of
illness avoided or a reduction in the risk of some acute condition (e.g. asthma).  The selection
of a measure in the health example alters the relevant benefit concept used for the numerator
(CST).  As a rule the unit value is treated as a constant, regardless of the size of the change
experienced by each individual.
CSP can also be expressed for a quality change but it may not be measured in numerical
units that are linked to uses of the resource.  In this case the denominator in (1) is replaced by a
measure of the amount of use (dT) rather than the change in quality.  This approach requires a
one-to-one correspondence in the measurement of quality adjusted quantity.  It would be used
if the quality change is treated as being experienced over a number of trips (and users).  For
such applications, di and Ni would be reinterpreted as trips (or days) per user and the number of
users respectively, the d0 ￿ N0 term in equation (1) would not be relevant because we would
want to estimate the gains experienced by all users under the new quality regime.
This distinction can be subtle for some applications.  It arises because CST is being
reinterpreted as the consumer surplus for a quality change experienced by the "typical" user.
dT is the amount of use per person observed in the study experiencing the improvement.
d1 ￿ N1 is the amount of use that the analysts anticipate would take place with the improved
conditions.
Each adaptation to the basic format such as this one changes the mix of assumptions
required to interpret the results as consistent with the basic benefit concepts.  Such adaptations
seem likely to also affect the performance of the approach as an estimator for the benefits
associated with the change.  However, none of the adjustments is directly linked to the
underlying concept of willingness to pay that we would like to measure.  All of the transfer
strategies appear to start from a Hicksian approximation for consumer surplus associated with
price changes.  Equations (2) and (3) provide the relationships for the compensating variation
(CSC) and equivalent variation (CSE) measures for price changes in a single commodity from
P0 to P1 (with q0 and q1 the corresponding quantities demanded).5
( ) 0 1 1 q q P CSC - =   (2)
( ) 0 1 0 q q P CSE - =   (3)
Comparing equation (1) to equations (2) and (3), our formulation of the typical benefit
transfer method, seems to confirm this conclusion.  The logic for transfer provides a direct
parallel to the logic originally outlined by Hicks [1942].  When Hicks defined compensating
and equivalent variation measures for consumer surplus it appeared that the information
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required to implement these concepts would not be available.  Thus, he likely promotes these
measures as first order approximations to the original definitions for a price change.6
Another approximation commonly used in tax applications is Harberger's [1971]
method for measuring deadweight loss, given in equation (4) as CSH. Harberger's proposal
might seem to be an average of the CSC and CSE.  Actually the logic underlying his strategy is
more complex.  He assumes that there is no change in the total expenditures on the
commodities experiencing the price change.7
( )( ) 0 1 1 0 2
1
q q P P CSH - + =   (4)
Conventional benefit transfers assume that the policy reduces bad outcomes (e.g.
avoids premature deaths, reduces acute and chronic morbidity effects, reduces maintenance
required by accelerated corrosion or soiling, etc.) or increases the capacity to support
desirable activities (e.g. increases a lake or river's ability to support fishing or swimming).  In
this case the unit value serves as a "price" for the specific outcome assumed to change with
the policy.  As we noted, this parallel extends to the benefit transfers used in cases where
policies reduce risks of mortality or morbidity effects.  For them, reductions in pollution may
reduce the risk of premature death for specific populations.  The risk of death at an exposure
level is akin to the amount of use at each quality level (di) in equation (1) and the population
experiencing the change is comparable to the numbers of people (Ni) engaged in the activity.
While the value of a statistical life is a simple transformation of an ex ante marginal rate of
substitution, MRS, and therefore variable with the size of the risk, it is nonetheless usually
treated as a constant like a "price."
Thus, the benefit values are used as if they were virtual prices (i.e. marginal willingness
to pay measures) for the quantity or quality change associated with the policy.  Moreover, to
the extent the unit value is defined in terms of uses allowed (i.e. fishing days) or impacts
avoided (i.e. avoided sick days), then there are also implicit assumptions being made about the
relationship between the environmental quality of interest and some observable quantity.  To
see how this is different from a first order approximation for the value of a quantity or quality
change, consider a simple version of a Hicksian expenditure function, e(.), with priced goods,
(and P a vector of prices) one non-priced good, Z, and a quality feature for Z, measured by s.
The Hicksian consumer surplus (WTP) for a change in quality from s0 to s1 is given in equation
(5) with U0, the initial utility level, and Z0 the level of the non-marketed good:
                                               
6 The concept of consumer surplus as originally defined by Marshall was controversial for over fifty years.
Hicks sought to rehabilitate the idea but proposed measures that many economists felt could not be measured.
This set of maintained beliefs changed in the seventies with the work of Willig [1976], Burtless and Hausman
[1978], Hanemann [1978], and Hausman [1981].
7 Assuming no change in incomes as a result of the price change, equation (4) follows from Harberger's [1971]
equation (5N).7
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Figure 1:  Quality as a Quantity ChangeSmith, Van Houtven, and Pattanayak  RFF 99-36
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(total and marginal) people would place on the change.  Morey's [1994] critique of using
consumer surplus per trip in recreation applications is an example of this larger problem.
The second problem is much less apparent from most of the applications of benefit
transfer techniques.  There is nothing in the methods that assures the measures of willingness
to pay will be consistently related to household income (i.e. the transfers do not necessarily
incorporate the restrictions implied by "ability to pay").  For the most part, virtual prices
(marginal willingness to pay) are treated as constants, regardless of the scale of the changes
being evaluated.  With small, localized changes, the income effects may not be large.  In
others, such as the Costanza et al. [1997] effort to measure the annual value of the earth's
ecosystems and EPA's [1997] retrospective analysis of the net benefits of the Clean air Act,
the results do not satisfy simple comparisons for economic consistency.  For Costanza et al.
the estimated global annual willingness to pay for these ecosystem services exceeded the
global gross domestic product.  For the EPA report, the change was treated as creating an
asset whose impact on the average household income was implausibly large.  The changes
being evaluated in each of these studies were so large that these income/willingness to pay
relationships became extremely important.
Harberger's approach anticipated this possibility.  His approximation for price changes
(equation (4)) builds in an assumption that total expenditures on the commodities affected by
the price change do not themselves change.  As Hines [1998] has suggested, Harberger's
alternative to ordinary and compensated demands was an effort to form a simple general
equilibrium demand function that recognized the importance of the income effects for large
policy induced changes in prices.11  He sought to evaluate policies after accounting for the
                                               
11 One approach to characterizing the Harberger demand would be to assume utility is maximized subject to two
constraints--the budget exhaustion condition as well as a restriction that a subset of the expenditures are held
constant as a group.  In the Harberger case this constant would be equal to the initial expenditures on this same
group.  In our analysis this is designated as "k."  This framework implies that Harberger demand would be derived










where Vj= partial derivative of indirect utility with respect to argument j.
We know that  0 <
i p V , Vm>0 and Vk=0.  Rearranging terms in the definition of Xi and then integrating over the
path(s) of change in one price, pi , we have the usual expression for the change in utility attributed to the price change:
￿ ￿ ￿ + = - = D
s
i i k m
s
i p dp X V V dp V V
i
) (
Combining Vm and Vk in this way offers a basis for understanding the Harberger strategy as a method to reduce the
effects of assuming a constant marginal utility of income (Vm) on the Marshallian consumer surplus (MCS) as a
measure of  V D .  This term was a central focus of most of the early discussions of the properties of the MCS.
One way to see what Hines attributes to Harberger's reasoning is to consider the change in the composite Vm +
Vk with respect to pi.  The terms can change in opposite ways for normal goods, i.e.  0 <
i mp V  and  0 >
i kp V .
Thus, it is conceivable that we would reduce the sensitivity of consumer surplus measures along a HarbergerSmith, Van Houtven, and Pattanayak  RFF 99-36
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estimation of travel cost and contingent valuation models.14  In our case, these links provide the
identifying restrictions to allow calibration of the preference function.
To illustrate how this strategy works, we have focussed on developing benefit
estimates for a variety of water quality changes using contingent valuation, travel cost, and
hedonic estimates.  This approach illustrates how preference calibrated benefit transfers could
be implemented right now with existing information.  The first example uses travel cost and
contingent valuation (CV) results.  The second uses CV and hedonic estimates.  The last
combines all three sources for benefit measures due to water quality changes.
A.   Travel Cost and Contingent Valuation
Consider the task of estimating the recreational fishing benefits from water quality
improvements with two sources of benefit information.15  One source uses a contingent
valuation estimate that includes all possible uses at all lakes, and the second focuses on
recreational fishing and the effects of quality changes for the ability to catch fish.  The
specific contingent valuation study we selected to illustrate this example has been the
"linchpin" of nearly all EPA's water quality benefit estimates--Mitchell and Carson's 1983
survey (reported in Mitchell and Carson [1984], [1986], Carson and Mitchell [1993]).  This
survey sought to estimate people's willingness to pay to undertake policies that would
improve water quality at ninety-nine percent of the nation's waters.16
The second study by Englin et al. [1997] relies on a travel cost framework.  It has two
components.  One model links water quality, measured using dissolved oxygen, to total trout
catch in New England lakes.  These catch models were then used in a second model that
describes recreationists' demand for fishing trips.  The authors report the average consumer
surplus for improvements in dissolved oxygen for a set of lakes used by residents of New
York (excluding New York City), New Hampshire, Vermont and Maine during 1989.  The
illustrative benefit computation in their paper involves an increase in water quality for the
poorest lakes to a minimum dissolved oxygen level of 6.0 mg/liter.17  This scenario is
somewhat similar to the logic underlying the Mitchell-Carson CV question which asks about
improving water quality in water bodies throughout the U.S.
We focus on the Mitchell-Carson estimates of improvements from boatable to fishable
conditions (i.e. conditions suitable to support game fish).  Based on the RFF water quality
                                               
14 There have now been several array of applications of this strategy such as Nikletschek and Lèon [1996], Eom
and Smith [1994], and more recently, extensive use of revealed and stated choices as part of conjoint analysis
with a RUM framework.  See Adamowicz et al. [1997] as an example.
15 This task would parallel the case studies commissioned by the Office of Water and reported in the benefit-
cost analysis of municipal wastewater treatment for the Upper Mississippi and Potomac Rivers by Donlan, et al.
[1995].
16 Mitchell and Carson's question offers an improvement "where 99 percent or more of the freshwater bodies are
clean enough so game fish like bass can live in them" [Mitchell and Carson, 1989, p. 385].
17 They indicate that dissolved oxygen ranged from 0.88 to 11.94 mg/liter in their lakes with a mean of 3.4
mg/liter.  38 of the 61 lakes used in their sample had dissolved oxygen below 6.0.Smith, Van Houtven, and Pattanayak  RFF 99-36
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of the change.25  For convenience we assumed income was at the level implied by converting
the Mitchell-Carson estimate described earlier to 1995 dollars using the CPI.  An advantage of
the calibrated approach to benefit transfer is that we do not have to make this assumption.
Income estimates can be set to correspond to local conditions.  An estimate of average roundtrip
travel cost is also required.  This could also be adapted to fit the specific policy application.
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A $100 1 4 10.45 $208.71 $147.26
B $100 3 6 20.14 $627.96 $283.79
C $100 5 6 20.14 $332.97 $94.60
Several further aspects of these computations should be highlighted.  The levels of
baseline and improved quality affect the estimated WTP for the change in water quality.  In
conventional transfer approaches adjustments for differences in most income or baseline
conditions are ad hoc.  The table also presents one auxiliary measure that can be computed
from the calibrated model as a plausibility check.  Two predicted trip levels per household are
presented to illustrate the computations.  Other measures such as the price elasticity of
demand, or with more complex preference specifications, other features of demand could be
computed for comparison.
This process offers one simple way to demonstrate how the same empirical
information used for conventional benefit transfers could be used to calibrate preferences.
We deliberately used only the information available in published papers and widely available
reports.  The choices for how to use the record involved simple compromises.  There may
well be much better choices for many of these variables.  However, this criticism misses the
point of our example.  With this preference specification (and many others), we do not require
new primary research to develop consistent benefit transfers.
B.   Hedonic Property Value and CV
Suppose that the benefit transfer used a different set of existing information.  This
alternative set of benefit estimates for improvements in water quality could arise from site
specific amenities rather than from benefits due to fishing or other observable recreation.
                                               
25 More specifically, the Englin et al. [1997] benefit measure, is divided by the change in average dissolved
oxygen levels (i.e. 5.0-3.5) to calculate a "per trip consumer surplus per unit of water quality."  The quantity is
then multiplied times the proposed change in dissolved oxygen and the predicted trips at the highest quality level.Smith, Van Houtven, and Pattanayak  RFF 99-36
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Such amenity benefits would be measured by changes in property values, and, in this
situation, the benefit transfer would combine CV results with hedonic estimates.  While it
could also be suggested that the hedonic approach captures a wider set of benefits, the
physical connection between the location of the house and the resource experiencing water
quality requires that we rely on water bodies providing owners fairly immediate access.
Equally important, because models describing the purchase of a house usually assume an
ex ante perspective, it is reasonable to assume that specific use patterns are uncertain.  In this
sense, the hedonic framework could imply values for amenities conveyed simply by the
location as well as better access for use of the resource's amenities.  In any specific
application, it may not be clear how the benefits measured for lakes in close proximity to an
individual'' home relate to the benefits to the consumers from being able to enjoy quality
improvements at more distant sites.  However, this concern is not a new one; it has been a part
of the qualifications raised with most benefit transfer studies.26
Each indirect valuation method implicitly establishes a different spatial link between
people and quality improvements in water bodies close to them.  Therefore, if we are to use a
range benefit estimates (marginal or total willingness to pay for quality changes), the adopted
preference structure must explicitly resolve differences in these hypothesized links between a site''
water quality and people'' preferences.27  This and the next example illustrate that specific
assumptions about the links between people's well being and environmental quality result in
specific resolutions of the degree of overlap between different benefit measures that are available.
Linking hedonic and contingent valuation estimates requires that we acknowledge
their different connections to preferences, as we did for the example using the travel cost and
CV estimates in calibration.  Hedonic models provide an estimate for the marginal rate of
substitution between environmental quality and a numeraire good (usually money).  This
estimate can also be interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay evaluated at a specific level
for the water quality.  It is widely recognized that the ability to estimate this marginal
willingness to pay at a point does not necessarily imply it is possible to recover the full
marginal willingness to pay schedule [see Freeman 1993, Bartik 1987, and Epple 1987].28
                                               
26 Indeed, it may explain the durability of the Mitchell-Carson study.  That is, the format of their CV question
makes this distinction explicit by attempting to capture all reasons for valuing water quality improvements at all
water bodies in the U.S.  In separate questions their survey also considered how respondents would adjust their
responses for changes at only local resources and for partial improvements in water quality.
27 McConnell [1990] recognized this issue in his discussion of the overlap in estimates from hedonic and travel
cost methods.
28 While there are several reasons for this conclusion, important among them is the fact that the analysis
assumes consumers have different preferences. This qualification is not relevant to preference calibration
because our approach to transfer requires that the analyst assume a specific preference function for the
representative individual.  Feenstra [1995] is a notable alternative case.  In this case, however, a specific form of
preference heterogeneity is assumed in order to allow the demand behavior to be represented by the utility of a
representative consumer.Smith, Van Houtven, and Pattanayak  RFF 99-36
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by those buying the houses.31  An important implication of this difference for applications is
the point raised by Poe [1998].  There is a clear need to establish consistent links in the
various technical measures used in each behavioral model that contributes to a calibration.
These links become part of the maintained assumptions that contribute to the performance and
plausibility of results from that calibration.
For this example we use water quality measured by the secchi disk reading.  Estimates
of the marginal willingness to pay for water quality and income are taken from one of the
groups of towns used in the studies by Michael et al. and Lawson.  The group we selected was
designated the Lewiston/Auburn market area and includes four lakes--Sabattus Lake, Taylor
Pond, Thompson Lake, and Tripp Pond.  The average housing price was $105,704 (in 1995
dollars), the water quality reading measured with clarity corresponded to swimmable
conditions.  It was linked to other measures of water quality based on the RFF water quality
ladder.  To establish a one-to-one connection between the various pollutants contributing to
the index that defines the "rungs" of the ladder, we assume that levels of other pollutants also
declined as clarity improved.  At a secchi disk reading of 5.66 meters (the water clarity
measure), the estimated marginal willingness to pay (using the housing price) is $4,569.  The
household income reported in Michael et al. is $82,074.  Mitchell and Carson reported an
estimate of $242 annually (in 1983 dollars) for cleanup of all lakes and rivers from their
current conditions to at least swimmable conditions.
To assure consistency with the static framework implied by the model, three
adjustments must be introduced to the available benefit information.  As in the first example,
the benefit estimates must be converted to consistent dollars.  In this example, the hedonic
model's focus on the cleanup of water quality at local lakes offers a reason for considering
another aspect of the Mitchell Carson results.  We used their estimate of the portion of the
national benefits that can be specifically attributed to local improvements.  Based on their
respondents' answers to a question asking about local improvements, they estimated this
fraction to be .67.32  Second, the housing price and marginal willingness to pay were
converted to annual equivalents using Poterba's [1992] annualization factor which reflects the
income tax and property tax effects on the rental cost of housing.  While his annualization
factor was computed for 1990 we assumed it would be relevant for 1995.
Finally, the hedonic model must be linked to the physical interpretation offered for the
water quality described in the contingent valuation study.  This question was resolved for our
earlier use of Englin et al. travel cost and Mitchell-Carson studies by linking them both to
                                               
31 Hanemann [1978] identified this issue at an early stage in his empirical study of water quality and beach
recreation.  Bockstael et al. [1988] consider how these perceptions are formed and confirmed the importance of
perceptions.
32 The Mitchell Carson survey asked about partial improvements in two ways.  The first of these considered
how respondents would adjust to improving water quality at all water bodies.  The second and source of the .67
estimate focused on the spatial features of the improvement.  It asked respondents how they would divide their
total willingness to pay between their state and the rest of the nation.  See Carson and Mitchell [1993] for further
discussion.Smith, Van Houtven, and Pattanayak  RFF 99-36
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The right side of (28) defines the change in value of access because quality has changed.  It is
reflected in the change in the site rent with A1 , but the 
1 dA
MCS ¶ (the change in seasonal
consumer surplus, X1@hN(A1)) must also be taken into account.  Consistent calibration of
preferences from existing travel cost and hedonic estimates requires recognition of the role of
amenities realized through the two adjustment margins and some resolution of how this
information contributes to preferences.
Our analysis assumes the travel cost measures do not reflect changes in rent, but the
hedonic rent (for those adjusting their locations) does take into account the enhanced value of
recreation associated with water quality improvements.  The reason for the difference is due
to the conditions likely to characterize the studies being used to calibrate preferences.  The
hedonic model assumes people are adjusting their locations in response the differences in
environmental amenities.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that studies reporting hedonic
estimates would be cases where individuals recognized the full gains from adjustment.
A short run orientation for the recreation component of the estimates used in calibration
and a long run for the hedonic is not necessarily a contradiction.  This reasoning recognizes
that the estimates come from different people.  The calibration strategy should assume that
these people have a common preference function but does require that the constraints they face
have to be the same.  In fact, it is probably more reasonable to assume that they will be
different as we consider the various modes people use to adjust their behavior in response to
differences in the water quality available and what they would like to have.35
This approach contrasts with conventional joint estimation of models based on two or
more responses to environmental quality changes.  In those types of applications, the
constraints facing each individual are assumed unchanged across revealed preference
methods.  This assumption is plausible because the model focuses on the multiple adjustments
of the same person (or household).  The changes are represented as taking place within the
same decision horizon and as a result the constraints would be unchanged.36  Estimates of the
preference parameters are possible because the analyst is able to observe variations in
responses to the different constraints across people in the sample face.  This information
allows the models to be estimated.  In our case the framework recognizes that calibration
relies on incomplete information from different sets of people.  We include all the ways of
adjusting by consistently combining these separate adjustments in the calibration of a
common preference function.
The last component of the information used in this example involves incorporating the
results in equation (28) into the definition of willingness to pay and using it along with the
                                               
35 Our discussion of the long run versus short run distinction is artificial.  Both models are static descriptions of
behavior.  One holds a set of potential choice variables constant.  The other does not.  Our terminology labels the
first short run and the second long run.  The difference between them is intended to provide some insight into the
role of adjustment for monetary measures of tradeoffs defined from individuals' choices.
36 With contingent valuation studies, it is conceivable that the constraints facing an individual would be altered
as well as the environmental quality.  Indeed, this is exactly what the discrete response format does when
offering a tradeoff between higher cost and quality improvement.Smith, Van Houtven, and Pattanayak  RFF 99-36
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cost used at each stage must be consistent with each study's conditions.  The "take away
message" is that calibration must represent the constraints relevant to each set of valuation
measures.
Table 5 uses the calibrated function to estimate the benefits from three different water
quality changes.  All three realize the final endpoint of approximately swimmable conditions.
They differ in the starting point.  The size of the water quality increment declines with each








) to the WTP
estimate is in the range of 0.7 to 0.8.
Table 5.  Benefit Measures from Preferences Calibrated with Travel Cost, Hedonic,
and CV Estimatesa
          Water Qualityb




















a Calibrated parameters are b=2.29, a=.0029, and b=.05.  The last of these parameters is an approximate
solution.  The hedonic marginal price is taken from Larson [1997].  The travel cost information relies on Englin,
Lambert, and Shaw [1997] and Englin and Lambert [1995].  Based on the RFF Water Quality ladder DO=6.5 is
swimmable, DO=4.0 is rough fishing, and DO=3.5 is boatable conditions.
b The numbers correspond to dissolved oxygen (DO) levels.  The numbers in parentheses are secchi disk
readings in meters.
It might seem that the results in the table contradict the arguments we made initially for
undertaking calibration to develop a consistent set of benefit transfers.  That is, it appears the
sum of the hedonic approximation and the Marshallian consumer surplus measure of the
enhanced value of recreation trips due to the water quality improvements approximates the
"consistent" WTP reasonably well.  This correspondence contrasts with what would seem to be
implied by our formal model as well as by McConnell's discussion of a comparable issue.
However, there is no contradiction in the two sets of results.  The models we specified
demonstrate relationships between the marginal values not the integrals of these marginal
values.  So, our approximation is not the area under the Marshallian willingness to pay derived
from a hedonic price function.  It is a linear extrapolation.  Thus, the fairly close proximity
between calibrated WTP and the sum is an accident of the numerical example we selected.Smith, Van Houtven, and Pattanayak  RFF 99-36
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D.   Lessons from the Calibration Examples
Our examples are more than a collection of "tricks with algebra."  They highlight four
underappreciated aspects of benefit transfers.  First, the task associated with developing
benefit estimates to evaluate a new policy should be interpreted as an identification problem.
That is, when transferring benefits we must judge whether there is sufficient information to
develop a theoretically consistent measure of the benefits for the changes being considered.
Second, benefit estimates assembled from studies that used different methods will often
require that the same aspect of environmental quality be represented with different technical
measures.  Consistent use of these benefit estimates requires that compatible indexes of
environmental quality.  Differences in how this is accomplished may well be as important to
discrepancies in transferred estimates as any distinctions in economic assumptions underlying
those estimates.39  Third, to reconcile multiple, overlapping measures of people's incremental
benefits from changes in non-market resources we must specify how each of these adjustment
margins is interrelated to the others.  Finally, the observed economic tradeoffs that people
make to obtain increases in non-market resources are constrained by their available incomes.
None of the existing approaches to benefit transfer meet the simple Harberger test.  That is,
when transferring benefits, we must ensure that measured WTP are affordable, i.e. well within
people's disposable income.
Our comparisons of the differences between the common approximations for benefit
measures and the calibrated measures avoided describing one as "correct."  Differences
between them do not reflect one method's errors.  Both embody errors.  The correct measures
of willingness to pay would consider how individuals experiencing a change in environmental
quality would actually respond to that change.  This ideal can never be measured.Analysts
always face compromises.  By definition, evaluation implies analyzing outcomes that have
not taken place.  Benefit transfer adds to the questions about any benefit analysis of a
proposed change by using different people's choices for different resources (than the one(s)
considered for the policy) to measure the benefits of the policy.  The accuracy of these
transfers depends on how our assumptions about the people and the resources compare to
what is actually the case.  For each set of assumptions we can no doubt readily derive
different conclusions for the available benefit transfer practices.
The primary argument that can be made for preference calibration as a strategy is that
it imposes economic consistency conditions on the ways the existing information is used, and
therefore avoids simple contradictions in the transferred results.  Experience and experiments
(with CGE models) comparable to what has taken place for nearly fifty years with Harberger
approximations for the deadweight losses provide the only basis for judging whether this
strategy will be uniformly better.  This conclusion does not imply we need to wait for fifty
years of experience to consider revising current practices.  Rather, it implies that we have a
clear roadmap to follow in evaluating preference calibration.  In the meantime, while we wait
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IV.   IMPLICATIONS
Conventional practices used in benefit transfers are analogous to approximations that
were developed to measure the consumer surplus associated with price changes.  They have
been used in ways that do not assure they will be consistent with the economic concepts
underlying the definition of willingness to pay for quantity or quality changes.  Moreover, the
larger the change being evaluated, the greater is the likelihood of serious biases.
While it is relatively easy to identify errors with the implausible estimates associated with
the Costanza et al. [1997] estimate of the global aggregate of the annual willingness to pay for the
services of the earth's ecosystems or EPA's [1997] retrospective evaluation of the Clean Air Act, it
is also possible to find large inconsistencies in small scale, simple transfers.  We illustrated this
possibility with the Williamette case study.  Unfortunately, Harberger approximations to control
for income effects do not apply when the goods involved are not priced.
To meet these shortcomings, we have proposed treating benefits transfer as analogous
to an identification problem.  That is, consistent transfers require sufficient information to
recover either the marginal willingness to pay function (or enough of it) to estimate the benefits
of proposed policies.  This strategy is similar to the logic proposed by Ebert [1998] and can be
applied with limited data.  It can calibrate a preference function to a single baseline point or
provide the basis for specifying a set of relationships as estimating equations (when there exists
a large number of benefit estimates for the same aspect of environmental quality).
In measuring the welfare effects of policy-induced price changes, it is possible to
avoid the inconsistencies that can arise with environmental benefit transfers.  This can be
done by imposing consistency as part of the approximation (e.g. measuring changes along
Harberger demands) or by using computable general equilibrium models.  However, for most
environmental resource applications, neither strategy has been possible.40  In this paper we
impose similar consistency checks on the calculation of policy induced benefits by calibrating
existing benefit information to a preference function.41  Our examples illustrate this approach
can work where there are sufficient estimates to permit identification of simple preference (or
marginal willingness to pay) functions.
Congressional mandates now call for benefit-cost analyses to evaluate the performance
of regulatory programs [see Office of Management and Budget, 1998].  If responses to these
                                               
40 The task associated with introducing non-market goods into CGE models is more complex than the limited
literature on the topic has acknowledged.  There are at least two aspects of this added complexity.  First, all
revealed preference methods assume specific forms of nonseparability which result in linkages between
marketed goods and the environmental media giving rise to the nonmarketed environmental quality (e.g. air
pollution depends on both the emissions and the diffusion system).  This connection affects the conventional
practices using social accounting matrices in calibration.  Second, the models usually represent economic
activity as if it takes place at a point.  Thus, the spatial variation that is a central element for these processes is
not reflected.  For an example that proposes one way to address these questions see Smith and Espinosa [1996].
A more detailed discussion of the methodological issues is in Espinosa and Smith [1999].
41 In so doing, we follow McConnell’s [1992] argument that "the power of economics lies principally with the
logic of theory, and then with the strength of empirical evidence…[because there is] no single way to
mechanically transfer a model."Smith, Van Houtven, and Pattanayak  RFF 99-36
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requirements are to avoid discrediting the practice of benefit cost analysis, they must recognize
the need for imposing internal consistency measures of the gains (and losses) attributed to
interrelated (from the consumer's perspective) but independently administered regulatory
policies.  Given the scale of these policies, it may not be possible to meet this goal without a
complete general equilibrium framework.  There exist real concerns about a sequence of
implausible benefit-cost analyses developed with off-the-shelf estimates and current transfer
practices is real.  Avoiding these implausible and inconsistent estimates requires considering
the importance of the consistency achieved with calibration.  Using a benefit transfer strategy
that identifies and calibrates a preference function (or its equivalent) is a first step in
developing that more completely account for the effects of large scale policies.Smith, Van Houtven, and Pattanayak  RFF 99-36
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